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Introduction
Unanticipated in ‡ation redistributes nominal wealth from lenders to borrowers, while unanticipated de ‡ation shifts wealth in the opposite direction. Understanding which countries and which parts of society are a¤ected by such in ‡ation-induced redistribution is of interest for a number of reasons: it contributes to understanding the welfare implications associated with price level surprises and thereby the welfare gains associated with price stability; furthermore, in a situation with elevated in ‡ation or de ‡ation risk, it allows to identify those parts of society that are most exposed to such risk; …nally, within a monetary union such as the Euro Area, the size and the direction of the redistribution are likely to be helpful for understanding countries' incentives to shape union-wide monetary policy outcomes and for understanding their participation incentives.
We thank Heinz Herrmann, Michael Scharnagl and Ulf von Kalckreuth for helpful comments and suggestions. Any potential errrors are our own. The views expressed in this paper re ‡ect the opinions of the authors and not nessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the European System of Central Banks. This paper systematically quanti…es the distributional e¤ects associated with unexpected price level movements in the Euro Area (EA). 1 It documents that even a moderately sized unexpected movement in the aggregate price level induces quantitatively important wealth redistribution in the EA. We show this by integrating the newly available Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which is collected by the European System of Central Banks, with Euro Area Accounts (EAA) data, which provide detailed sectoral balance sheets for all EA countries. Creating an integrated system of nominal accounts allows us to document which EA countries are winners and losers of unexpected in ‡ation (or de ‡ation), how much each of the countries is winning and losing, how di¤erent economic sectors within each country are a¤ected by such price level movements, and how gains and losses are distributed at the individual household level.
We begin our analysis by computing the net nominal position (NNP) of each country, each sector and each household. 2 The NNP is a measure of the nominal claims minus nominal liabilities held by an economic agent or economic sector and measures how exposed it is to price level changes. It comprises the direct nominal positions, which consist of nominal claims and liabilities held outright, but also the indirect nominal positions, which arise from the ownership of …rms (directly or indirectly via investment funds). Since …rms are leveraged entities, the indirect nominal position can be an important component of overall in ‡ation exposure. We fully account for this by attributing the net nominal position of the corporate sector to its ultimate owners (domestic households, domestic governments, foreigners).
The EA as a whole turns out to be a winner of unexpected in ‡ation, as it holds a substantially negative net nominal position (NNP) vis-a-vis the rest of the world. A 10% surprise increase in the price level, for example, leads to a per capita gain of approximately 1080 e, which equals 4.2% of EA per capita GDP. A corresponding price level decrease would lead to an overall loss of the same amount and smaller price level adjustment lead to proportionally smaller e¤ects.
Overall, the redistribution risks associated with price level uncertainty are sizable and suggest that -to the extent that households are risk averse -there exist strong incentives for avoiding unexpected in ‡ationary or de ‡ationary episodes in the EA.
The aggregate gains associated with price level increases turn out to be fairly unevenly distributed within the EA. The so-calls GIPS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) turn out to be the biggest winners of unexpected price level increases, 3 with all of them winning between 1330 e (Portugal) and 2410 e per capita (Greece) from a 10% surprise increase in the price level. For Greece this amounts to about 14% of per capita GDP, while the gains equal about 9% of per capita GDP for Spain and Portugal and 6% for Italy. Malta and Belgium lie 1 Section 2.6 describes in detail what we mean by unexpected price level movements. Throughout the paper we focus on unanticipated price level changes, due to lack of information about the maturity structure of bondholdings at the sectoral level (except for the government sector) and at the individual household level. This together with lack of information on whether nominal assets carry a …xed or variable coupon rate prevents a rigorous assessment of the distributional consequences of anticipated in ‡ation. 2 The country level analysis fully includes the government sector, i.e., next to government claims and liabilities also those held by EA central banks, e.g., via the TARGET2 payment system. 3 Correspondingly, these countries are the biggest losers of unexpected price level decreases.
on the other end of the spectrum and are net losers of unexpected in ‡ation, with each of them losing about 4% and 9% of per capita GDP, respectively. The per capita GDP gains in the EA thus range from -9% in Belgium to +14% in Greece.
Considerable di¤erences exist across EA countries also at the household (HH) level. We document this fact by de…ning the HH's in ‡ation exposure as its NNP per unit of net wealth owned. This measure captures how exposed a HH is to unexpected in ‡ation (or de ‡ation) per unit of net wealth and allows for a comparison across HHs with di¤erent wealth levels and across countries with di¤erent wealth distributions. A value equal to one, for example, indicates that the HH has invested all its net wealth in nominal assets; a value of zero indicates that the HH faces in net terms no exposure to price level risk, while a negative value indicates that the HH is on net a debtor of nominal claims, thus a winner of unexpected in ‡ation. 4 We then document that the cross-sectional distribution of HH in ‡ation exposures varies considerably across EA countries. For example, the GIPS countries and the former transition countries (Slovakia and Slovenia) have comparatively many HHs with a close to zero in ‡ation exposure, i.e., HHs owning on net only real assets. In addition, these countries have comparatively few HHs who hold virtually all their net wealth in the form of nominal claims. The opposite is true for some of the EA 'core'countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands), which -across all EA countries -have the highest share of HHs holding basically all net wealth in the form of nominal assets; these countries also have the lowest share of HHs with a close to zero in ‡ation exposure.
Considering HHs'in ‡ation exposure across age cohorts and broad social classes (rich, middle class and poor HHs), we document that the EA as a whole looks very similar to the U.S. and Canada, as previously analyzed by Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Meh and Terajima (2008) , respectively. In particular, young cohorts turn out to be net debtors of nominal claims while older cohorts are net holders of nominal claims. Quantitatively, the EA exposure numbers are very close to the U.S. numbers, when aggregating across all social classes of an age cohort. 5 As a result, unexpected in ‡ation leads to a wealth transfer from older HHs to younger HHs. While in the U.S. the bene…ciaries of unexpected in ‡ation are young middle class and young poor HHs, the bene…ts in the EA are concentrated entirely among young middle class HHs. Young poor HHs in the EA hold in net terms virtually no in ‡ation exposure.
We also explore the e¤ects of unexpected in ‡ation for wealth inequality in the EA. We …nd that surprise in ‡ation leads to a decline in the Gini coe¢ cient for the EA net wealth distribution, as would be the case with a progressive net wealth tax. This occurs because young borrowing HHs, who are winners of in ‡ation, are poorer than older HHs, who are losers of in ‡ation. Yet, important di¤erences exist with regard to this …nding across EA countries: in Austria, Germany and Malta the young middle class HHs borrow on average relatively little, so that wealth inequality actually increases following surprise in ‡ation, similar to what would be the case with a regressive wealth tax.
Overall, we …nd that in the EA the 'in ‡ation tax' is relatively ine¤ective in generating government revenue in the sense that it requires relative high tax rates to achieve a given level of revenue. We document this by comparing the revenue generated by a 10% surprise increase in the price level to that of a more conventional proportional tax on net wealth. For most EA countries the same government revenue can be generated by a proportional wealth tax in the range of 1-2%. For some countries (Finland and Cyprus) the wealth tax can be as low as 0.5%, although for Greece it would have to amount to approximately 4%. This result is obtained even though the wealth tax, unlike the in ‡ation tax, fails to tax foreigners.
We also document that the cross-sectional distribution of the in ‡ation exposures across HHs correlates at the country level strongly with the country's in ‡ation experience since the inception of the EA: countries that experienced higher in ‡ation rates tend to be ones where HHs are borrowing more (relative to net worth) and where fewer HHs hold their net worth predominantly in nominal assets. Indeed, grouping countries according to their past in ‡ation experience gives rise to a …rst order stochastic dominance ordering with respect to the in ‡ation exposures in the HH sector. We also …nd that past in ‡ation correlates with the marginal e¤ects of net worth on in ‡ation exposures in the cross section. This suggests that the in ‡ation risk exposure of HHs is in ‡uenced by past in ‡ation experience.
In previous work, Doepke and Schneider (2006) rates and inequality and rationalizes it using a political economy model in which low income households are more exposed to in ‡ation than high income households.
In early work, Bach and Stephenson (1974) and Cukierman, Lennan, and Papadia (1985) study in ‡ation induced redistribution of nominal wealth. These studies do not integrate sectoral accounts with household data, as the latter were unavailable at the time, and also do not include indirect nominal positions (INP) arising from …rm ownership. Erosa and Ventura (2002) present a monetary growth model that is consistent with the evidence on heterogeneity in transaction patterns and portfolio holdings, focusing on the e¤ects of anticipated in ‡ation for transaction balances and their redistributive e¤ects. The present paper studies the distributional implications of unanticipated in ‡ation and takes into account liquid and illiquid nominal claims.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data sets, the procedures for integrating them into a coherent accounting framework, and the accounting methodology for computing net nominal exposures. Section 3 presents our baseline …ndings regarding the redistributive e¤ects across EA countries and across di¤erent economic sectors in each EA country. It also discusses the robustness of these …ndings to alternative assumptions and integration approaches. Section 4 presents information about the cross-sectional distribution of in ‡ation exposures at the HH level, documenting important di¤erences across EA countries. It also o¤ers a comparison with U.S. and Canadian data. Section 5 analyzes how wealth inequality is a¤ected by unexpected in ‡ation. Section 6 documents the relationship between past in ‡ation experience and the cross-sectional distribution of in ‡ation exposures at the HH level. A conclusion brie ‡y summarizes and provides an outlook on future work. The appendices o¤er additional and more detailed information about individual EA countries and about the accounting methodologies.
2 Data Description and Accounting Methods
HFCS -Household Finance and Consumption Survey
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is a coordinated HH survey covering all EA countries, except for Ireland. The core questionnaire is common among the countries and provides detailed household-level balance sheet information. Financial variables are all reported at market value. The survey covers about 62,000 households and the reference year for the latest available survey wave is 2010. Data is collected using a harmonized methodology to insure country-level representativeness. To maximize comparability across countries, the survey output is harmonized through usage of a common set of target variables. The survey also employes a common blueprint questionnaire to foster input harmonization. The survey is multiply imputed to account for missing data and oversamples wealthier households. Household weights are adjusted for unit non-response and calibrated to external information such as population distributions. Basic stylized facts of the survey are documented in HFCN (2013b HFCN ( , 2013a .
EAA -Euro Area Accounts
The Euro Area Accounts (EAA) provide detailed balance sheet information for a number of economic sectors (households, non-…nancial corporations, …nancial corporations, government and rest of the world) for each Euro Area country and for the EA as a whole. The sectoral balance sheets allow us to identify the nominal assets and liabilities held by each sector in each of the considered countries.
The EAA establish a quarterly integrated accounting system, which encompasses non…nancial accounts and …nancial accounts. The accounts are integrated to balance the changes in transaction accounts and balance sheets. The EAA is compiled according to the European System of Accounts, ESA95(1995) , which is the European application of the System of National Accounts 1993 , SNA93(1993 
HFCS Integration
This section explains how we integrate the HFCS data with the EAA, so as to obtain a coherent accounting framework for discussing the distributional e¤ects of unexpected in ‡ation across countries, economic sectors and households.
We …rst construct from HFCS data the variables showing up in the EAA HH sector balance sheet, following the suggestions in Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) , and then aggregate these across HHs to compute HFCS aggregates corresponding to the EAA positions. Appendix A explains in detail how this is achieved. The HFCS aggregates thus obtained tend to di¤er from their EAA counterparts, with the former typically falling short of the latter. This occurs for a number of reasons, discussed in Kavonius and Törmälehto (2010) , Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) and HFCN (2013b) , one of which is that the HH sector in the EAA comprises non-pro…t institutions, e.g., private foundations, while these institutions are not part of the HFCS data set; another one is that business wealth of the HH sector is (under certain conditions) classi…ed as a …nancial asset in the EAA, while we classify it as a real asset when using the HFCS survey, see appendix A for further details.
In a second step, we integrate the HFCS data into the EAA, adopting as our baseline the integration strategy pursued also in Doepke and Schneider (2006) , which adjusts the counterpart positions in the other sectors of the EAA data set pro-rata in line with the HFCS aggregates. 6 As a robustness check, we also perform the opposite approach, which amounts to rescaling the HFCS aggregates, so as to obtain the corresponding position in the HH sector balance sheet of the EAA. When considering sectoral aggregates only, the latter approach is identical to just using EAA data. We show in section 3 that these two approaches lead to very similar conclusions for the sectoral NNPs and thus for the sectoral redistribution e¤ects associated with unexpected movements in the price level.
Computation of Net Nominal Positions (NNPs)
This section explains how we compute the net nominal positions (NNP) of the HH sector, the …rm sector (F), the government sector (GOV), the rest of the world sector (ROW) and of individual HHs. The NNP is a measure of the net in ‡ation exposure of a sector or an economic actor arising from the ownership of nominal claims and liabilities. The NNP is expressed in Euros, with a positive (negative) NNP indicating that nominal assets exceed (fall short of) nominal liabilities. Economic actors with a positive NNP are losers (winners) from unexpected price level increases (decreases). The computation of the NNPs is based on the integrated HFCS-EAA data set, as described in the previous section.
As a …rst step, we compute the direct net nominal position (DNP), which comprises all nominal assets and liabilities, except those arising indirectly from the ownership of equity/…rms. In a second step, we add to this the indirect net nominal positions (INP) resulting from equity/…rm ownership. The NNPs of a sector or of an individual HH are then de…ned as the sum of the DNPs and INPs of the sector or HH.
We explain below how we compute the DNP of a sector or HH. The computation of the INPs is explained in section 2.5.
The DNP of each sector includes all …nancial assets net of …nancial liabilities, except for the equity parts on the asset and liability side. We also exclude monetary gold and special drawing rights (SDRs) from the nominal positions. We do so because these (government) positions have no counterpart in the private sector accounts of the EAA, so that by excluding them the NNP of all sectors sum up to zero (except for rounding discrepancies). 7 Exclusion of these items has a quantitatively small e¤ect on our results. Appendix A provides the list of variables used for computing the DNPs.
An important aspect for computing the HH sector NNPs regards the treatment of pension claims. In our analysis, we distinguish between pay-as-you-go social security schemes and other individual account based pension and life insurance claims. In particular, we exclude pay-asyou-go social security claims and payment obligations from our analysis, which amounts to assuming that the claims and bene…ts generated by these systems are fully indexed to the price level. This is partly motivated by the fact that neither the HFCS nor the EAA contain information on pay-as-you-go social security claims and bene…ts, but also by the fact that social security contributions tend to be a …xed share of nominal wage income, i.e., are e¤ectively indexed. 8
Regarding de…ned contribution and individual de…ned pension bene…t and life insurance schemes, we treat these claims in the HH sector, as well as their counterparts in the …nancial sector of the EAA, as nominal claims. This is motivated by the fact that insurance companies in the Euro area are predominantly invested in nominal claims. 9 Moreover, pension owners often do not have a direct claim on the (relatively small) equity positions of the insurance sector, as they often own such positions only indirectly via life insurance type contracts. This represents 7 Furthermore, monetary gold is de-facto a real asset, while SDRs represent more an outstanding credit line than a …nancial claim.
8 Some EA countries apply upper caps to social security contributions, which would cause contributions not to be fully indexed to the price level absent changes to social security law. 9 Of the e 6.7 trn of …nancial assets held by insurance corporations and pension funds in the EA, only about e 0.85 trn are invested in equity. A further e 1.6 trn is invested in mutual funds, but these are to a large extent themselves invested in nominal claims: the other …nancial intermediaries sector, which consists mainly of mutual, private equity and hedge funds, holds only about 36% of its assets in quoted and unquoted shares. This suggests that of the e 6.6. trn of pension assets in the insurance sector only about e 1.4trn (=0.85 trn+36% 1.7trn), i.e., only about 21% are invested in equities. Given that the other …nancial intermediaries sector contains also private equity and hedge funds, which tend to have a higher equity share, the true equity share is likely to be even lower.
an important institutional di¤erence relative to the U.S. where individual investment accounts are much more widespread in retirement plans.
Accounting for Firm Ownership
To compute nominal exposures, we need to account for …rm ownership by households (HH), the government (GOV) and the rest of the world (ROW). This is important because …rms tend to be leveraged claims, i.e., entities that on net issue nominal debt, so that …rm ownership represents a hedge against in ‡ation risk.
Let E HH and E GOV denote the equity claims of domestic households and the domestic government, respectively. 10 We shall assume that domestic governments own domestic …rms only 11 and decompose household equity claims into
where E HH_D and E HH_F denote domestic and foreign equity, respectively. Furthermore, let E F _A and E F _L denote the equity positions on the asset and liability side of the domestic …rm sector, respectively. 12 We decompose the asset side as follows
where E F _A_D denotes ownership of domestic …rms and E F _A_F ownership of foreign …rms.
Finally, let E ROW _A and E ROW _L denote the equity positions on the asset and liability side of the ROW, respectively.
Using these de…nitions we have
where the l.h.s. is the total equity issued by domestic …rms (E F _L ), net of the equity owned by the ROW (E ROW _A ) and the equity held by the GOV (E GOV ). The remaining equity must be held either by domestic …rms (E F _A_D ) or domestic households (E HH_D ). We also have
which states that the equity liabilities of the ROW (E ROW _L ) must either be held by domestic households (E HH_F ) or domestic …rms (E F _A_F ). 13
Equations (1)- (4) represent four equations in the four unknown variables (E HH_D , E HH_F ,
The equations are nevertheless insu¢ cient to determine the unknowns because the system su¤ers from a rank-de…ciency resulting from an accounting identity: summing equations (3) and (4) and using (1) and (2) to substitute the terms on the r.h.s. of the summed equation, one obtains the identity that the net equity claims of the domestic sectors (HH, GOV and …rms) must equal the negative of the net equity claim of the ROW. To identify all variables, one thus needs one additional identifying assumption. We shall consider the following scenarios which span the range of plausible assumptions:
Maximum HH Home Bias: All foreign equity is held by the domestic …rm sector (E F _A_F = E ROW _L ), which amounts to assuming a perfect equity home bias in households'equity portfolio (E HH_F = 0). 14 Identical Home Bias: Households and …rms are equally internationally diversi…ed in their equity positions, i.e., E F _A_F =E F _A_D = E HH_A_F =E HH_A_D .
Maximum Firm Home Bias All foreign equity is held by domestic households (E F _A_F = E ROW _L ), which amounts to assuming perfect equity home bias by …rms (E F _A_F = 0). 15
As our baseline we shall use the 'Identical Home Bias'assumption. Section 3 shows, however, that results regarding the net nominal positions of the HH, GOV and ROW sectors are very similar when entertaining one of the other identifying assumptions instead.
We are now in a position to compute the net nominal exposure of domestic …rms per unit of equity issued. 16 Let DN P F denote the direct net nominal position of the domestic …rm sector, i.e., nominal assets minus nominal liabilities of the …rm sector balance sheet. DN P F tends to be negative, as …rms issue typically more nominal debt relative to the nominal claims they hold.
DN P F does not include the nominal exposures generated in the domestic …rm sector due to the ownership of foreign …rms, which are themselves leveraged claims. We therefore add the latter positions.
Let R denote the net nominal claims per unit of equity issued by the domestic …rm sector
where E F _L E F _A_D denotes domestic …rm equity issued that is not held by domestic …rms
themselves. In what follows we will assume that the same nominal exposure ratio R applies to foreign equity held by domestic …rms. This appears justi…ed if domestic …rms'choice of R 1 3 Recall that we assume that the domestic GOV does not to own foreign equities. 1 4 For countries in which E ROW _ L > E F _ A we attribute the remaining foreign equity holdings to the houshold sector, i.e., then set E
we attribute the remaining foreign equity holdings to the …rm sector, i.e., then set E
HH_ A_ D together with equations (1), (2) and (4) it is straightforward to determine (
re ‡ects the preferences of domestic investors and if domestic …rms and households invest abroad on average in …rms with the same nominal exposure characteristics.
With this assumption we can compute the net nominal exposure of domestic …rms arising from ownership of foreign …rms, which equals R E F _A_F , so that total net nominal position of the domestic …rm sector T N P F is given by
We then distribute T N P F to the HH, GOV and the ROW sectors according to their ownership shares E HH_D ; E GOV and E ROW _A . Furthermore, we attribute the nominal exposure E HH_F R to the HH sector, due to outright ownership of foreign …rms by HHs. Within the household sector we distribute the exposures according to the relative ownership shares of equity reported in the HFCS survey.
To preserve symmetry of the nominal balance sheet positions between domestic agents and the ROW, we furthermore need to add the following nominal exposure to the ROW balance sheet, which arises from attributing the exposure from foreign ownership of …rms to HH, GOV, and ROW, as described above:
Proceeding this way we have incorporated nominal exposures of the …rm sector and of foreign equity holdings into the balance sheets of the households, government and the ROW.
Unexpected In ‡ation: The Thought Experiment
In the remainder of this paper we will consider the e¤ects of a one-time unexpected increase in the price level by 10%. By this we mean that all nominal prices increase by this amount, i.e., current prices but also all state-contingent future prices. As a result, all relative prices, including future in ‡ation as well as current and future nominal interest rates remain unchanged.
Provided the wealth redistributions generated by the price level surprise do not give rise to relative demand shifts, as would be the case, for example, when HHs have identical homothetic preferences, see Chipman (1974) , the new state contingent price path remains consistent with equilibrium. Moreover, the present value of …rm pro…ts remains unchanged, so that the e¤ects of unexpected price level changes on equity valuations can be captured by the changes in real value of …rms'total net nominal position (T N P F ), as determined in the previous section. This holds true whenever equity valuations are frictionless, i.e., re ‡ect the present value of future pro…ts plus the value of …rms'net …nancial claims.
While a 10% price level jump may appear large, especially given the historical experience in the EA, unexpected price level surprises repeatedly occur with smaller magnitudes. 17 The redistributive e¤ects of smaller or larger price level changes can be assessed by proportionally scaling the numbers reported in the present paper for a 10% increase in the price level increase.
In particular, when considering a price level decrease instead of an increase, all redistributive e¤ects reverse their sign.
3 Winning and Losing Countries and Sectors
Baseline Findings
Using the baseline methodology described in the previous sections, 1 9 This is 10% of the reported ROW EA NNP of 10.8 thousand Euros. 2 0 For Luxembourg, the NNP of the ROW before accounting for …rm ownerwhip is -1.1 trn e. After incorporating …rm ownership, this number shrinks to -17 bln e, which is large relative to population size, but small relative to the initial position and in absolute terms.
2 1 These problems do not a¤ect the distributional information obtained from HFCS data for Luxembourg, as reported later on.
2 2 This is due to the fact that in the Netherlands there exists a large and asymmetric discrepancy between HFCS aggregates and EAA aggregates: for …nancial assets the HFCS/EAA coverage ratio is only 0.33, while the ratio equals 0.92 for …nancial liabilities. This asymmetry could be due to a variety of reasons: interest payments on mortgage debt are tax deductable in the Netherlands, thus have been declared to authorities before; tax deductability may cause debt to be very stable over time and thus mentally easier to recall; the Netherlands The same applies for the results reported for Cyprus in table 1. 23 We shall thus also ignore the outcome for the Dutch and Cypriot data in rest of this section. 
Robustness Analysis
This section documents that most of the …ndings reported in the previous section turn out to be robust to entertaining a range of alternative assumptions. Table 3 : NNP per capita, alternative HFCS-EAA integration approach Next, we explore the e¤ects of an alternative approach for integrating HFCS data into the EAA. The baseline approach, described in section 2.3, consists of reconciling di¤erences in HFCS and EAA aggregates by adjusting the EAA counterparts of HFCS positions, in line with the approach in Doepke and Schneider (2006) . We now explore the e¤ects of pursuing the opposite strategy, i.e., rescaling HFCS positions to match the EAA aggregates. 24 
Winning and Losing Households
This section analyzes the redistributive e¤ects of unexpected in ‡ation at the level of individual as for individual EA countries. 26 The …gure abstracts from all EA household with a negative NW position (approximately 6% of all HHs), which will be discussed further below. 27 The exposure distribution for the EA displays a peak around the zero exposure point: is particularly pronounced in some of the EA 'core'countries, reaching 17% in Germany, 15% in Austria, 13% in the Netherlands, and 11% in Finland. It is lowest in some of the current crisis countries, i.e., Cyprus (2%), Italy (2%), Greece (4%) and Spain(4%), as well as in the former transition countries Slovenia (2%) and Slovakia (3%). Furthermore, the latter two countries display a high peak around the zero exposure point, with many HHs holding virtually no in ‡ation exposure (53% in Slovenia, 43% in Slovakia). The next highest values in this category are achieved by the crisis countries, with Greece reaching 45%, Spain and Italy both 36% and Portugal 30%. The lowest HH shares with virtually no in ‡ation exposure are found in Germany and the Netherlands (both 7%), followed with a distance by Belgium (15%) and Austria (16%). 
Comparison with US and Canadian Data
We now document HHs'nominal exposures across age cohorts and broad social classes, comparing results to those documented for the U.S. by Doepke and Schneider (2006) and for Canada by Meh and Terajima (2008) .
Following this earlier work, we de…ne -for any considered age cohort -'Rich HHs'as those within the top 10% of the cohort NW distribution. The remaining HHs of the cohort are then sorted by income into two additional groups, labeled 'Middle Class' (70% of the total population) and 'Poor HHs'(20% of all HHs, at the bottom of the income distribution of all nonrich HHs). For every cohort, we compute the average NNP and normalize it by average cohort NW. The resulting measure can be interpreted as the in ‡ation exposure of the representative or average household within the considered cohort. 
In ‡ation Tax, Wealth Tax and Inequality
This section explores the e¤ects of an unexpected price level increase for wealth inequality, using the Gini coe¢ cient for the HH net wealth distribution as inequality measure. It considers the EA as a whole, as well as individual EA countries and also compares the e¤ects of the in ‡ation tax to that of a revenue-equivalent proportional wealth tax. Table 6 below reports the Gini coe¢ cient of the observed net wealth (NW) distribution (second column), the Gini coe¢ cient after an unexpected 10% price level increase (third column), as well as the associated percentage change in the Gini coe¢ cient (fourth column). Table 6 reveals that net wealth inequality is highest in Austria and Germany and lowest in Slovakia and Slovenia. The results for the EA furthermore show that surprise in ‡ation decreases net wealth inequality for the EA as a whole. The same is true for all individual EA countries, except for Austria, Germany and Malta, where unexpected in ‡ation increases wealth inequality. In the latter countries, the young middle class cohorts are on net no or only very moderate borrowers, see table 5a. As a result, the young cohorts, which tend to be poorer in terms of accumulated net wealth (although not necessarily in terms of their expected present value of income), gain considerably less from surprise increases in the price level. Inequality therefore slightly increases following surprise in ‡ation. Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation across countries between the changes in the Gini coe¢ cient reported in table 6 and the average of the in ‡ation exposures (NNP/NW) of the youngest two middle class age cohorts reported in table 5a is equal to 0.817 and statistically signi…cantly at the 1% signi…cance level.
The fact that the in ‡ation tax a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cient of the EA net wealth distribution in the same direction as a progressive net wealth tax may appear surprising. The existing theo-retical literature, e.g., Erosa and Ventura (2002) , typically emphasizes the regressive nature of the in ‡ation tax when restricting consideration to nominal balances held for transaction purposes. Our results show that this fails to be the case when considering the e¤ects of unexpected in ‡ation for the real value of nominal claims and liabilities more generally.
The last column in table 6 reports the proportional net wealth tax (in percentage points) that raises the same amount of government revenue as implied by the 10% surprise increase in the price level. 31 It shows that the revenue equivalent wealth tax is much smaller than the in ‡ation tax. 32 This is obtained, even though the wealth tax applies to domestic HHs, i.e., unlike the in ‡ation tax, falls short of taxing foreign wealth and emerges because HH net wealth comprises a comparatively large amount of real assets, which remains untaxed with an in ‡ation tax. Table 7 : NNP elasticity w.r.t. NW and in ‡ation experience
Conclusions and Outlook
We document that quantitatively important redistributive e¤ects are associated with unexpected price level movements in the Euro area (EA). While the EA as whole is a sizable net winner of unexpected in ‡ation, these gains are unevenly distributed across countries, with some countries winning well above average and others even losing in net terms. The gains are also unevenly distributed across the household (HH) and government sectors, with the former typically being a loser and the latter being a winner of price level increases. Within the HH sector, gains and losses are also fairly unevenly distributed: rich older HHs turn out to be the largest losers and young middle class HHs the largest winners of unexpected in ‡ation.
Since risk averse households dislike wealth redistribution risk, the present …ndings highlight that achieving price stability in the EA can contribute in important ways to HH welfare.
Overall, the heterogeneity of HHs' in ‡ation exposure across EA countries, documented in the present study, highlights the need to understand further what motivates HHs to choose certain net nominal positions. Why are HHs in some countries, say rich older HHs in Belgium, so much more exposed to in ‡ation than their counterpart in Spain, which hold virtually no in ‡ation exposure? Understanding these and related questions appears important and requires additional structural modeling e¤orts.
A Integrating Survey Data and Financial Accounts
We compute NNPs in the EAA using the following …nancial variables (variable names and variable codes are as de…ned in ESA95 (1995) When integrating HFCS data into EAA data, we construct from the HFCS data the positions that correspond to those appearing in the EAA, essentially following the suggestions made in Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) . On the asset side we proceeded as follows:
Currency and deposits (F2): corresponds to 'Deposits' (DA2101) in the HFCS plus imputed currency. Currency has to be imputed in the HFCS, as information on it is not available. For this purpose we distribute the aggregate stock of currency (F21) recorded in the HH sector of the EAA to HHs in the HFCS proportionally to their deposit holdings.
Short-term debt securities (F331) and Long-term debt securities (F332): correspond to 'Bonds'(DA2103). Since no maturity information is available in the HFCS and since according to the EAA F331 amounts to only 0.1% of F332 in the HH sector of the EA, we attribute all of DA2103 to F332 and the set the HFCS counterpart of F331 to zero.
Short-term loans (F41) and Long-term loans (F42): corresponds to 'Amount owned to households'(DA2107) in the HFCS.
Quoted Shares (F511): corresponds to 'Shares, publicly traded'(DA2105) in the HFCS.
Unquoted Shares and other equity (F51M): corresponds in the HFCS to 'Net wealth in businesses, non-self-employment and not publicly traded'(DA2104) plus 'Self-employed business wealth' (DA1140), unless it is a sole proprietorship. Sole proprietorships are not included because the national account statistics record these assets as real assets of the HH sector instead of recording them in the …rm sector.
Mutual Fund Shares (F52): corresponds to´Mutual funds, total'(DA2102).
Net equity of households in life insurance reserves and in pension funds reserves (F61): corresponds in the HFCS to the sum of 'Public or social security account with account balance'(PF0510), 'Occupational pension plans with account balance'(PF0710), and 'Voluntary Pension/whole life insurance schemes'(DA2109). 38 3 8 Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) and Kavonius and Törmälehto (2010) explain that in the national accounts F61 contains de…ned contribution pension plans and individual de…ned bene…t plans because the EAA covers only the funded system. As stated in HFCN (2008) the HFCS pension wealth variables PF0510, PF0710, and DA2109 also only includes funded plans, i.e., the value of individual pension plans and the value of all de…ned contribution occupational plans.
Prepayments of insurance premiums and reserves for outstanding claims (F62):
since there exists no HFCS counterpart to this variable, we assign a zero value to it in the HFCS. Quantitatively, F62 amounts to 6% of F61 in the EAA for the EA as a whole.
Other accounts receivable and …nancial derivatives (F7+F34): corresponds to 'Other …nancial assets'(DA2108) in the HFCS.
The HFCS variable 'Managed accounts'(DA2106) has no single conceptual counterpart in the EAA, as the EAA does not distinguish whether or not an investment account is self-managed or not. We deal with this by distributing DA2106 to the HFCS variables DA2101, DA2102, DA2105 (the counterparts of F51M) and DA2108 proportionally before applying the matching scheme described above. We do so to capture the fact that managed accounts typically comprise assets from these asset categories.
On the liability side we apply the following scheme:
Loans, short-term (F41) and Loans, long-term (F42): corresponds in the HFCS to the sum of 'Mortgages or loans using household main residence as collateral' (HB170$x and HB2100), 'Mortgages or loans using other properties as collateral' (HB370$x and HB4100), 'Non-collateralised loans'(HC080$x and HC1100), 'Outstanding credit line/overdraft balance' (HC0220), 'Outstanding credit cards balance'(HC0320).
Derivatives (F34): we assign a zero here, as the HFCS value is included on the asset side (HFCS counterpart to F7+F34). The national accounts, assign -by convention -derivative values to the liability side, recording a negative value, if required. The latter does not a¤ect results as we are interested in net values only.
Net equity of households in life insurance reserves and in pension fund reserves (F61): in the EAA this covers the pension commitment of small enterprises in Italy, which are classi…ed into the HH sector in Italian EAA. The HFCS does not provide information on this item and we set it to zero. In Italy F61 amounts to about 3.5% of total HH sector liabilities.
Other accounts receivable/payable (F7): there exists no counterpart to this in the HFCS so that we set it to zero.
A further issue with integrating HFCS data into EAA data arises because the HH sector in the EAA includes all households and non-pro…t institutions serving households (NPISH), e.g., churches, political parties, and non-pro…t universities, while the HFCS only covers households in the narrow sense and also excludes some households, e.g., elderly living in institutionalized households. When aggregating HFCS data to obtain HH sector aggregates we adjust the aggregates by the NPISH item-speci…c shares provided by Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) to obtain EAA counterparts. We also adjust for population coverage using the numbers provided by the same authors.
B Household Characteristics Across the NNP/NW Distribution: Country Level Information Median age is unavailable for Malta where age information is coded using age bracket information only.
C In ‡ation Experience and In ‡ation Exposure: Further Details
Figure 4 redraws …gure 2 for the subpopulation of outright homeowners that do not hold a mortgage; it con…rms the …ndings reported in …gure 2 for the overall population. Figure 5 depicts the outcomes for the subpopulation of renters (who do not own a house). It shows that the for the middle in ‡ation group of countries there is relatively large jump around zero, which may again be the due to credit restrictions. 
